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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-3(3) (j) and 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Did the district court err in ruling that because 
First Security did not receive notification to the 
contrary, it was entitled to satisfy its 
obligations solely with Capitol, the original 
account creditor? 
A. Did the district court err in holding 
that section 70A-9-318 governs this action and 
requires actual receipt of notification? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing the legal conclusions 
of the district court, this court conducts a de novo 
review. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 
799 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1990). 
B. Is the district court's factual finding 
that First Security did not receive notification 
clearly erroneous?1 
*4447 Associates states that the question is whether the 
district court erred "in ruling that First Security, after being 
put on notice of the collateral assignment of the Purchase 
Agreement to Zions, did not have a duty to obtain the consent of 
Zions prior to entering into the Settlement Agreement" with 
Capitol. Brief of Appellants at 4 (emphasis added). To phrase 
the issue in this way is misleading. The district court found 
that First Security was not put on notice of the assignment. 
1 
Standard of Review: Regarding the factual findings of 
the district court, the appellate court determines 
whether all of the evidence, as marshaled by the 
appellant, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom is insufficient to support the district 
court's findings.2 Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
II. Did the district court err in ruling that, as a 
matter of law, the purchase price should be 
adjusted downward by $1,000,000.00. 
Standard of Review: This issue was decided by the 
district court on a motion for partial summary 
judgment. Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the 
facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment and affirms a grant of summary 
judgment only if the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. First American Commerce 
24447 Associates sets forth in its brief the standard of 
review for mixed questions of law and fact. It is unclear why 
4447 Associates cites this standard because it does not argue 
anywhere in its brief that this appeal raises mixed questions of 
law and fact. "A mixed question of law and fact is one in which 
'the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of 
law is undisputed, and the issue is whether . . . the rule of law 
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" 
State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint. 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)). This 
is not the circumstance here. 
2 
Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1194 
(Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3): 
The account debtor is authorized to pay 
the assignor until the account debtor 
receives notification that the amount due or 
to become due has been assigned and that 
payment is to be made to the assignee. A 
notification which does not reasonably 
identify the rights assigned is ineffective. 
If requested by the account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable 
proof that the assignment has been made and 
unless he does so the account debtor may pay 
the assignor. 
II. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26)(b): 
A person "receives" a notice or 
notification when: 
(i) it comes to his attention; or 
(ii) it is duly delivered at the 
place of business through which the 
contract was made or at any other place 
held out by him as the place for receipt 
of such communications. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable Frank G. Noel. The 
lawsuit was instigated by Zions First National Bank ("Zions") on 
March 3, 1987, to collect amounts allegedly due to Zions under an 
agreement between First Security Financial ("First Security") and 
Capitol Thrift & Loan Company ("Capitol"). Capitol had 
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previously assigned, as collateral, its interest in the 
agreement to Zions. Capitol later entered into a settlement 
agreement with First Security extinguishing First Security's debt 
to Capitol under the agreement. 
On February 23, 1990, First Security filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment. That motion was granted by the 
district court on May 24, 1990. (A copy of the Order of Partial 
Summary Judgment is attached as Addendum A.) The court found 
that, as a matter of law, the purchase price identified in the 
agreement between First Security and Capitol "shall be adjusted 
downward in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)." 
Record at 39 8. 
In June 1990, Zions assigned its interest in the 
agreement to the appellant, 4447 Associates. 4447 Associates was 
subsequently substituted as the sole party plaintiff.3 
On January 6 and 7, 1991, the remaining issues in the 
case were tried before the Honorable Frank G. Noel. On 
January 30, 1992, Judge Noel issued a memorandum decision holding 
that the plaintiff, 4447 Associates, "failed to prove that First 
Security received sufficient notice of the assignment, as 
required by law," to preclude it from satisfying its debt with 
the original creditor, Capitol. Memorandum Decision at 8 (a copy 
3The court reserved until after any appeal the issue of 
First Security's right to collect attorneys' fees in this matter 
from Zions, the original plaintiff. Record at 783. 
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of the Memorandum Decision is attached as Addendum B). On 
September 25, 1992, the court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Findings"). (A copy of the Findings is 
attached as Addendum C.) Judgment was entered in favor of First 
Security on November 3, 1992. On December 2, 1992, 4447 
Associates filed its notice of appeal from the district court's 
judgment. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a two-day trial, the district court made the 
following findings of fact: 
1. First Security Financial ("First Security") and 
Capitol Thrift & Loan Company ("Capitol") were parties to an 
Asset Purchase Agreement and a Closing Agreement dated 
December 10, 1982, and December 13, 1982, respectively. Findings 
(Addendum C) at 1 1. These two documents are collectively 
referred to by the district court and hereafter in this brief as 
the "Purchase Agreements." 
2. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreements, First 
Security purchased certain assets from Capitol. The Asset 
Purchase Agreement provided that First Security would pay Capitol 
$1,007,777.42 on December 13, 1985. The Purchase Agreements also 
provided for quarterly interest payments to be paid from First 
Security to Capitol in the amount of $25,194.44. Findings at 
1 2. 
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3. The Purchase Agreements also provided that the sum 
of $1,007,777.42 due on December 13, 1985, was subject to an 
offset amount not to exceed $1,000,000.00. Findings at 1 3. 
4. Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") was the 
president, chief operating officer, and a director of First 
Security from the time of its inception in December 19 82 through 
November 1984. He was also president and chief executive officer 
of Capitol until June 1984. Findings at 1 4. 
5. From December 1982 to and including September 27, 
1984, First Security paid its quarterly interest installments to 
Capitol. Findings at 1 5. 
6. In June 1984, the shareholders of Capitol, 
including Christenson, sold all of their Capitol stock to AFS 
Holding Company, an affiliate of the Bertagnole Investment 
Company. In June 1984, Christenson ceased, for a period of time, 
to have any ownership interests in Capitol, and ceased to 
function as an officer or director. Findings at 1 6. 
7. In the summer of 1984, Capitol owed Zions First 
National Bank ("Zions") approximately $870,000 on a revolving 
line of credit. This line of credit was unsecured. Findings at 
1 7. 
8* On or about September 28, 1984, Emanuel A. Floor, 
acting as president of Capitol, and Zions executed an Assignment 
and Security Agreement, giving Zions a security interest in 
Capitol's receivable owing on the Purchase Agreements and 
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directing Capitol to place First Security on notice of the 
Assignment and Security Agreement, This Assignment and Security 
Agreement ("Assignment") was given to secure a one-million-dollar 
note, dated September 28, 1984, which Capitol executed in favor 
of Zions. The purpose of this note was to refinance the $870,000 
obligation which was previously owed to Zions by Capitol. 
Findings at \ 8. 
9. Christenson personally guaranteed the 
September 28, 1984 Note up to $870,000. Findings at 1 9. 
10. For the purposes of giving notice to First 
Security concerning matters relating to the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, the only address provided to Capitol by First Security 
was: 
First Security Financial 
P.O. Box 30006 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
ATTN: Treasurer 
Between December 1982 and July 1985, any mail sent to this 
address would have been delivered to Elmer Tucker. Findings at 
1 10. 
11. Elmer Tucker was the treasurer of First Security 
from its inception through and beyond July 10, 1985. Findings at 
1 11. 
12. Emanuel A. Floor in his capacity as president of 
Capitol executed a Notice of Assignment on or about September 28, 
7 
1984. That Notice of Assignment was mailed to First Security but 
was never received by First Security.4 Findings at 1 12. 
13. Elmer Tucker never received the notice signed by 
Mr. Floor, and was never made aware of the Assignment until 1986. 
Findings at 1 13. 
14. No individual representing or authorized to act on 
behalf of First Security received written notice of the 
Assignment prior to 1986. Findings at 1 14. 
15. No one acting on behalf of Zions sent written 
notice of the Assignment to First Security prior to 1986, nor did 
Zions communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at 
any time between September 8, 1984, and July 10, 1985. Findings 
at 1 15. 
16. Zions never received written acknowledgment from 
First Security that First Security had received notice of the 
Assignment or notice of any purported obligation to pay any 
monies under the receivable to Zions. Findings at 1 16. 
17. On September 28, 1984, Christenson was president, 
chief executive officer, and a director of First Security 
Financial. At that same time, he was not an officer, director, 
4The testimony at trial was that Mr. Floor did not actually 
mail the notice himself. Rather, he signed the document "and 
then someone else took care of delivery." Transcript at 138. No 
testimony was offered at trial concerning the identity of the 
individual who actually mailed the document, nor that the 
document was in fact mailed. 
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or employee, nor had he any ownership interests in Capitol. 
Findings at 1 17. 
18. To the extent that Allen Potts ("Potts"), an 
employee of Zions, discussed with Christenson the Assignment, the 
discussions were primarily of an intent by Zions to enter into 
the agreement, all of which discussions preceded execution of the 
Assignment by Capitol and Zions. Findings at 1 18. 
19. Capitol did not default on its obligations secured 
by the Assignment until at least December 1985. Findings at 
1 19-
20. The Assignment and Security Agreement, and the 
Notice of Assignment signed by Mr. Floor both stated that First 
Security was obligated to make all payments owing under the 
receivable payable jointly to Capitol and Zions during the entire 
term of the Purchase Agreement.5 Zions never received directly 
from First Security any of the quarterly interest payments it 
claims to have been entitled to under the Assignment. Findings 
at 1 20. 
21. Zions received interest and principal payments on 
the Capitol loan directly from Bertagnole individuals or 
entities. Findings at 1 21. 
^ith regard to the Notice of Assignment, the district court 
found that First Security did not receive the Notice. Findings 
at 1 12. With regard to the Assignment and Security Agreement, 
First Security was not a party to that agreement and there was no 
testimony at trial that Christensen was aware of the specific 
terms of the agreement. 
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22. Zions never attempted to collect any amounts from 
First Security under the Assignment until after December of 1985. 
Findings at 1 22. 
23. Prior to July 19 85, Christenson delivered on two 
separate occasions his personal financial statements to the 
president of First Security, Bud Cummings. Paragraph 3 of each 
of those financial statements reads as follows: 
This represents my portion of the ownership 
of Capitol Thrift & Loan based on the 
contract amount I have with First Security 
Financial. This receivable has been pledged 
to Zions First National Bank. 
Findings at 1 23. 
24. A third financial statement containing the 
identical paragraph 3 referenced above was delivered by 
Christenson's attorney to First Security's attorneys prior to 
July 1985. Findings at 1 24. 
25. On or about July 10, 1985, First Security, 
Christenson and Capitol entered into that certain Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Covenant Not To Sue, whereby First 
Security's obligations to Capitol were satisfied in full. See 
Findings at 1 25. 
26. In late 1986, 4447 Associates borrowed over three 
million dollars from Zions, and used those proceeds to purchase, 
among other things, a participation interest in the Capitol note, 
which included a security interest in the collateral for the 
note, First Security's receivable. In June 1990, Zions assigned 
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to 4447 Associates all of its ownership interests in the Capitol 
loan and the First Security receivable. Findings at 1 26. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT BECAUSE FIRST 
SECURITY DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION TO PAY ZIONS, IT WAS 
ENTITLED TO SATISFY IT OBLIGATIONS SOLELY WITH CAPITOL, THE 
ORIGINAL CREDITOR. 
The district court expressly found that First Security 
did not receive notification of the assignment and the 
instruction to make payments to Capitol's assignee, Zions. The 
court applied the proper legal standard, and its factual findings 
are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, this court should affirm 
the district court's judgment. Given the finding that First 
Security did not receive notification, First Security was 
entitled by statute to satisfy its obligation with the original 
account creditor, Capitol. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE 
MUST BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD BY $1,000,000. 
Even if First Security were liable to 4447 Associates, 
the district court correctly held that the purchase price must be 
adjusted downward by one million dollars according to the plain 
language of the Purchase Agreements.6 The argument put forth by 
4447 Associates is contrary to the unambiguous language of the 
Purchase Agreements and to common sense. 
6This court needs to address this issue only if it 
determines that the judgment of the district court must be 
reversed on the issue of notification. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT BECAUSE FIRST SECURITY 
DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION TO PAY ZIONS, IT WAS ENTITLED 
TO SATISFY ITS OBLIGATIONS SOLELY WITH CAPITOL, THE ORIGINAL 
CREDITOR. 
The district court held: 
The court is of the opinion that under 
the circumstances of this case it was 
necessary for First Security to actually 
receive notice of the pledge of the 
collateral before it could be burdened with a 
legal obligation to make payments under the 
Asset Purchase Agreement to the assignee, 
that is Zions. The notice must be sufficient 
so that someone in the position of First 
Security must rely with some degree of 
certainty on the notice to begin making 
payments under the contract to someone other 
than the obligee. First Security was 
obligated to make payments to someone. To 
make those payments to someone other than the 
original obligee would put them at risk and 
may eventually result in their having to pay 
twice under the contract. Therefore, some 
vague notice that the contract had been 
pledged as collateral was not, in the Court's 
opinion, sufficient notice. In addition, a 
pledge of collateral may mean at least one of 
two things. It may mean that the payments 
under the contract at the time of the 
assignment were to be made to the assignee, 
or it may mean that an effort to collect on 
the contract by the assignee would not be 
made until the assignor defaulted on it's 
[sic] obligation. First Security cannot be 
left to guess as to whom they must make their 
payments. 
It is worth noting again that a pledge of a 
note as collateral does not necessarily mean 
that the obligor is obligated to immediately 
begin making payments under the obligation to 
the assignee of the obligation. Indeed the 
conduct of the parties clearly demonstrates 
12 
to the Court that Zions did not intend to 
receive payments under the Asset Purchase 
Agreement from First Security until Capitol 
defaulted on the loan. 
Memorandum Decision (Addendum B) at 3-4, 7. The district court 
specifically held that rfit was necessary for First Security to 
actually receive notice of the pledge of the collateral before it 
could be burdened with a legal obligation to make payments under 
the asset purchase agreement to the assignee, that is Zions." 
Id. at 3. 4447 Associates had the burden of proof at trial. The 
district court held that 4447 Associates had not met this burden 
and had failed to prove that First Security received notification 
of the assignment. Id. at 8. 
As set forth below, the decision of the district court 
should not be overturned. First, the district court applied the 
proper legal standard. Second, its factual findings are 
accurate, or at the very least cannot be shown to be clearly 
erroneous. 
A. The District Court Properly Held That Section 70A-9-318 
Requires Actual Receipt of Notification. 
The district court properly held that this case is 
governed by section 70A-9-318 of the Utah Code. That statute 
provides: 
The account debtor is authorized to pay the 
assignor until the account debtor receives 
notification that the amount due or to become 
due has been assigned and that payment is to 
be made to the assignee. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 70A-9-318(3) (1990) (emphasis added). In this 
case, First Security was the account debtor. Under the plain 
language of section 70A-9-318, First Security was entitled to pay 
its creditor, Capitol, until it received notification of two 
things: (1) that Capitol had assigned the contract to Zions, and 
(2) that payment was to be made to the Zions. Id. The district 
court did not err in ruling that the plain language of this 
statute applies here. 
In an effort to convince this court to reverse the 
judgment of the district court, 4447 Associates argues that 
"Zions was not required to provide actual notice to First 
Security to make all future payments to Zions." Brief of 
Appellants at 22. 4447 Associates goes so far as to argue that 
"Section 70A-1-201(25-27), rather than Section 70A-9-318, governs 
the manner of giving notices of assignments of contract rights." 
Id. at 26 (emphasis added). As demonstrated below, both of these 
arguments are frivolous and should be rejected by this court. 
1. In the Absence of Receipt of Notification, First 
Security Was Entitled To Satisfy Its Obligation To 
Its Original Creditor, Capitol. 
4447 Associates makes the argument that "Zions was not 
required to notify First Security where or to whom it should pay 
money under the Purchase Agreements." Brief of Appellants at 24. 
See also id. at 22. 4447 Associates argues that notice was not 
required because the assignment granted Capitol the right to 
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continue to collect the balance due.7 This is precisely the 
point relied upon by First Security and by the district court. 
Because, as 4447 Associates points out, "Capitol had the right to 
continue to collect the balance due," First Security was entitled 
to deal with Capitol in extinguishing its debt until it received 
notification to the contrary. 
Under the express terms of the Utah statute, until 
First Security received notification to make the payments to 
Zions, First Security was entitled to satisfy its obligations 
with Capitol, the original creditor. Zions failed to do so at 
its peril. In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"absent notice, it is to be noted that the claims of the Bank, as 
assignee, were subject to any defense the Church, as account 
debtor, had against Cook, as assignor, 70A-9-313(1)(a)." Bank of 
Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 534 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975). In 
this case, First Security entered into a settlement agreement 
74447 Associates even cites the case of Jack B. Parson Cos. 
v. Nield for the proposition that when an assignment is made for 
purpose of security only (as this one was), the assignment has 
"'no significance whatever once the loan was paid.'" 751 P.2d 
1131, 1133 (Utah 1988) (quoting Jeffs v. Citizens Fin. Co., 319 
P.2d 858, 858 (Utah 1958). See Brief of Appellants at 23. 4447 
Associates points out that this case does not involve the 
assignment of real estate, as does Jack B. Parson Cos. Id. at 
24, n.68. However, if the Jack B. Parson Cos. case applies at 
all, it establishes that the assignment in this case should be 
"treated as a mortgage" and that the assignment has "no 
significance whatever" now that the debt has been paid. Jack B. 
Parson Cos.. 751 P.2d at 1133. 
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with Capitol that fully extinguished First Security's debt. 
Absent receipt of notification by First Security prior to the 
time the settlement agreement was entered into, 4447 Associates, 
as the successor in interest to Zions, is subject to the defense 
that the debt has been completely satisfied. 
The district court's decision in this case is supported 
not only by the clear language of the statute, but by sound 
public policy. It is fundamentally unfair to require First 
Security to pay its debt twice when Zions took no steps to ensure 
that First Security received notification that payments should be 
made to Zions. There was testimony at trial that the practice 
"normally" followed by Zions when sending notice of an assignment 
was to "send [the debtor] a letter and ask for their 
acknowledgement." Transcript at 106. Mr. Potts of Zions 
testified that "when you got [the acknowledgement] back that's 
when you decided to sign it." Id. This testimony makes clear 
that the rule of law contained in the UCC and followed by the 
district court does not impose an undue burden upon assignees. 
Indeed, the rule, if followed, avoids the very type of dispute 
now before the court in which an assignee is contending that a 
debtor should have to pay a debt twice. The UCC is based upon 
the sound public policy that the debtor must actually receive 
notification of the assignment and the duty to pay the assignee. 
It is an easy matter for the assignee to ensure that 
receipt is received. For example, the assignee can send the 
16 
letter by registered mail, or it can follow the practice 
"normally" followed by Zions in requesting an acknowledgment. 
In this case, the court found that Zions not only 
failed to send a notice by registered mail or to request an 
acknowledgement, but that Zions did not send any kind of a 
written notification. Findings (Addendum C) at 1 15. The 
district court found further that Zions did not even communicate 
with First Security regarding the assignment between the time the 
assignment was executed and the time First Security settled its 
debt with Capitol. The court found: "[N]or did Zions 
communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at any 
time between September 8, 19 84 [a date prior to the Assignment] 
and July 10, 1985 [the date of the Settlement Agreement]." Id. 
Given the lack of notification or communication from Zions during 
the relevant time period, First Security was free--as a matter of 
law-- to satisfy its obligation with its original account 
creditor. 
2. By Statute, the Determinative Question Is Not 
Whether Zions Gave Notice But Whether First 
Security Received Notification. 
4447 Associates spends much of its brief arguing that 
Zions gave notice to First Security of the Assignment. First, as 
noted above, the district court found that precisely the opposite 
is true. As quoted above, the district court found: "No one 
acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice of the assignment 
to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions communicate with 
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First Security regarding the Assignment at any time between 
September 8, 1984 and July 10, 1985." Findings at 1 15. Second, 
as set forth below, even if the district court's factual finding 
that notice of the assignment was not given is clearly erroneous, 
the judgment in favor of First Security must be affirmed. As a 
matter of law, the question is not whether Zions gave notice of 
the assignment but whether First Security received notification. 
Furthermore, it is not enough for First Security to receive 
notification of the assignment alone. By statute, First Security 
must receive notification of both (1) the assignment and (2) the 
duty to pay Zions. 
4447 Associates argues that "evidence that a notice is 
sent, regardless of some evidence of non-receipt, is sufficient 
to comply with section 70A-2-201(26)." Brief of Appellants at 26 
n.76. 4447 Associates cites as support for this argument the 
case of Chrysler Dodge Country, USA v. Curley. 782 P.2d 536 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) . As pointed out by 4447 Associates, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held in Chrysler Dodge that "it is not necessary 
that the debtor actually receive notice, merely that the notice 
is sent to an address where the creditor can reasonably expect to 
reach the debtor." Id. at 541. However, what 4447 Associates 
fails to tell this court is that the Chrysler Dodge case involves 
a completely different section of the UCC than the one governing 
this case. Chrysler Dodge dealt with the question of whether 
sale of a repossessed truck had been handled in a commercially 
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reasonable manner. Section 70A-9-504(3) governs the disposition 
of collateral and states: 
[U]nless collateral is perishable or 
threatens to decline speedily in value or is 
of type customarily sold on a recognized 
market, reasonable notification of the time 
and place of any public sale or reasonable 
notification of the time after which any 
private sale or other intended disposition is 
to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor. 
Because the statute in the Chrysler Dodge case required that 
notice "shall be sent," that case has no applicability to the 
case before this court. In this case, the UCC requires not that 
notice be sent, but that notification be received. 4447 
Associates stipulated before trial, and the district court found, 
that First Security had not received the Notice of the assignment 
executed by Mr. Floor. Nor did First Security receive any other 
notification from Zions. 
Even though 4447 Associates stipulated that the Notice 
itself was not received, 4447 Associates argues that certain 
circumstances should have put First Security on sufficient notice 
of the assignment. In particular, 4447 Associates argues that 
First Security's president, Richard Christenson, had notice of 
the assignment. First, any notice Christenson had was not 
received by him in his capacity as an officer or director of 
First Security but in his individual capacity in his business 
dealings with Zions. Thus, even assuming knowledge on 
Christenson's part, that knowledge would not be imputed to First 
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Security. Second, the district court found that the discussions 
involving Christenson were primarily of an intent to enter into 
an assignment. Third, the financial statements of Richard 
Christenson (which he provided to First Security) contain no 
notice that payments should be made to Zions. Findings at 1 18. 
Thus, at the most, any notice that Christenson had went only to 
the first of the two requirements in section 70A-9-318(3). There 
was no evidence at trial that First Security received 
notification of the duty to pay Zions. 
As shown below, awareness of an intent to enter into an 
assignment--whether obtained through Christenson or otherwise--is 
not sufficient to prevent First Security from dealing with its 
original creditor. Further, even notification of an actual 
assignment is not sufficient--a debtor must also receive 
notification that it is to pay the assignee. 
a. Knowledge of an Anticipated Assignment Does 
not Impose any Duty on First Security. 
4447 Associates repeatedly argues that First Security 
was aware of the Assignment. However, as the district court 
noted, these discussions "were primarily of an intent by Zions to 
enter into the Agreement, all of which discussions preceded 
execution of the Assignment by Capitol and Zions." Findings at 
1 18 (emphasis in original). Thus 4447 Associates failed to meet 
its burden of proof. 
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As the district court noted, "First Security cannot be 
left to guess as to whom to make their payments." Memorandum 
Decision at 4. Notice of an intent to enter into an Assignment 
Agreement "alone would not be sufficient to put First Security on 
notice of the Assignment and to trigger the obligation of First 
Security to begin making payment to Zions." Id. at 6. 4447 
Associates argues that Christenson, who was the president of 
First Security, had notice of the assignment and that 
Christenson's knowledge is imputed to First Security. However, 
as noted above, "the discussions were primarily of an intent by 
Zions to enter into the agreement." Findings at 1 18 (emphasis 
added). Furthermore, "all" of the discussions "preceeded 
execution of the Assignment by Capitol and Zions." Id. Mere 
knowledge of an anticipated assignment (which is the absolute 
most that 4447 Associates proved at trial) is, as a matter of 
law, insufficient under section 70A-0-318(3). 
b. Knowledge of An Assignment Alone Does Not 
Impose a Duty Upon First Security to Make 
Payments to Zions or to settle the debt with 
Zions. 
Even assuming that Christenson's knowledge should be 
imputed to First Security and even assuming that Christenson knew 
that the intended assignment had actually been executed, 
knowledge of an actual assignment is insufficient. As 4447 
Associates notes in its own brief, the Assignment in this case 
allowed Capitol to "continue to collect the debt owed by First 
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Security." Brief of Appellants at 24. 4447 Associates argues in 
its brief that to notify First Security "where or to whom it 
should pay money under the purchase agreements . . . would be 
contrary to the express terms of the purchase agreements and 
customary commercial practice."8 Id. Thus, 4447 Associates 
tacitly acknowledges that Zions did not "require that payments be 
made to Zions." Accordingly, at the very most, First Security 
(including Christenson) had notice of the assignment. Even 
assuming that First Security was completely aware of the actual 
execution of the Assignment (and not just the intent to enter 
into the assignment, as the district court found), notice of the 
Assignment alone would not impose a duty upon First Security to 
begin making payments to Zions. There is no evidence that 
Christenson was aware of the actual terms of the assignment. He 
was not a party to it, and 4447 Associates--which had the burden 
of proof at trial--points to no evidence in the record that 
Christenson even saw or read the actual assignment document. 
Throughout its brief, 4447 Associates repeatedly 
ignores the dual requirements of section 70A-9-318. Not only 
must First Security receive notification of the Assignment, it 
84447 Associates' position is inconsistent. It argues that 
is would have been commercially unreasonable for Zions to give 
First Security notice, yet it argues that this is precisely what 
Zions did. Furthermore, even if Zions did not wish to notify 
First Security to make payments to Zions (because Zions had 
agreed to allow Capitol to continue to collect the payments), 
Zions should at least have notified First Security that First 
Security should not settle the debt with Capitol. 
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must receive notification of the duty to begin making payments to 
Zions. The statute provides that First Security was authorized 
to continue to pay its creditor until it received notification 
that the debt !!ha[d] been assigned and that payment is to be made 
to the assignee." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). The 
district court's ruling on this point was correct and should be 
affirmed by this court. 
As noted by the trial court, "First Security cannot be 
left to guess as to whom they must make their payments." 
Memorandum Decision at 4. This is the reason that the 
legislature has required actual receipt of notification. The 
rationale behind such a statutory rule has been explained by the 
Utah Supreme Court. In the case of Time Finance Corporation v. 
Johnson Trucking Company, 458 P.2d 1873 (Utah 1969), the supreme 
court quoted with approval the following language: 
The fact, however, of such substitution of a 
new creditor must, in order to make the 
debtor liable to the assignee, be brought 
home to the debtor with much exactness and 
certainty before he has paid the debt. The 
rule of notice to him is much more stringent 
than that which may defeat the title of a 
purchaser of a chose in action or of real 
estate. The latter is free to purchase or 
refuse to purchase as he chooses, and 
therefore it is his duty, before acting to 
trace out any reasonable doubt and to inform 
himself of the true facts as soon as anything 
arises to put him on inquiry. But the debtor 
is not so situated. He must pay to his 
original creditor when the debt is due unless 
he can establish affirmatively that someone 
else has a better right. The notice to him 
therefore must be of so exact and specific a 
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character as to convince him that he is no 
longer liable to such original creditor. 
4447 Associates argues that the Time Finance case should be 
distinguished because it was decided in the context of the right 
to receipt of insurance proceeds. However, this is a distinction 
without a difference. 4447 Associates has offered no reason that 
the sound policies embodied in Time Finance do not apply in this 
context. More fundamentally, the language of section 70A-9-318 
controls here and is clear: First Security was entitled to pay 
its original creditor until it "receive[d] notification" that 
(1) the assignment had been made and (2) payments were to be made 
directly to the assignee. Thus, the law applied by the district 
court is based on the Utah statute. Time Finance merely explains 
the policies behind a rule such as the one codified in the 
statute. Even if this court does as 4447 Associates requests and 
"entirely disregard[s] Time Finance," Brief of Appellants at 35, 
the court must affirm the decision of the lower court.9 
3. The Definitions in Chapter One of the UCC Do Not 
Provide Substantive Rules of Law. 
4447 Associates argues at length that notice was given 
to First Security as contemplated in section 70A-1-201 of the 
94447 Associates argues that First Security had a duty to 
inquire. However, the statute imposes no such duty. The only 
duty is the duty of Zions to ensure that First Security "receives 
notification." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). This duty 
is easily discharged by sending notification by registered mail 
or by following the practice "normally" followed by Zions of 
requesting an acknowledgement. See Transcript at 106. 
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Utah Code. In fact, 4447 Associates goes so far as to argue that 
"Section 70A-1-201(25-27), rather than Section 70A-9-318. governs 
the manner of giving notices of assignments of contract rights." 
Brief of Appellants at 26 (emphasis added). This argument puts 
the cart before the horse. Section 70A-1-201 of the Utah Code is 
entitled "General Definitions." It is relevant only if terms 
that are defined in that section are used elsewhere in the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The definitions provide no independent 
substantive rules of law. Thus, this court does not even need to 
refer to section 70A-1-201 unless an applicable substantive 
provision contains a term that is defined in chapter one of the 
UCC. 
In this case, the district court properly began its 
analysis by considering the substantive statutory provision. 
That provision is section 70A-9-318, which requires that First 
Security "receives notification." 
Once a court has analyzed the applicable statutory 
provision (section 70A-9-318), then the court should look to the 
definitions contained in section 70A-1-201 for additional 
guidance as to the definition of terms used in section 70A-9-318. 
In this case, section 70A-1-201(26)(b) provides guidance as to 
the term "receives notification," which is used in section 
70A-9-318. Section 70A-1-201(26)(b) provides: 
A person receives a notice or notification 
when: 
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(i) it comes to his attention; or 
(ii) it is duly delivered at the 
place of business through which the 
contract was made or at any other place 
held out by him as the place for receipt 
of such communications. 
This is the only definitional section that applies in 
this case. Under this definition First Security did not 
"receive[] notification" that the contract "has been assigned and 
that payment is to be made to the assignee." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-318 (1990) . The notification neither came to First 
Security's attention10 nor was it duly delivered to First 
Security's place of business. Furthermore, as set forth above, 
even if Christenson's knowledge of the anticipated assignment is 
imputed to First Security, the notification to pay Zions did not 
"come[] to his attention." 
In a related argument 4447 Associates asserts at length 
that First Security had "notice" of the Assignment under the 
definition of notice in subsection 25 of section 70A-1-201. That 
section provides: 
A person has "notice" of a fact when: (i) he 
has actual knowledge of it; (ii) he has 
received a notice or notification of it; or 
(iii) from all of the facts and circumstances 
to him at the time in question he has reason 
to know that it exists. 
10As pointed out above, there is no evidence that Christenson 
had any knowledge of the specific terms of the assignment. 
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First, as pointed out above, notice of an assignment alone does 
not impose any duty on First Security. Moreover, as a matter of 
law, the question in this case is not whether First Security (or 
Christenson) had notice of an assignment alone, but whether First 
Security received notification of both the assignment and the 
duty to make payments to Zions. Accordingly, the definitional 
sections relied upon so heavily by 4447 Associates simply do not 
apply in this instance. Subsection 25 provides a definition of 
when a person has notice. The district court correctly held that 
the question is not whether Zions gave notice but whether First 
Security received notification. 
4447 Associates also repeatedly argues that First 
Security had "reason to know" of the Assignment and of Zions' 
interest in the agreement between First Security and Capitol. 
However, the "reason to know" standard does not apply in this 
case. The reason to know standard is contained in the 
definitional section of the UCC regarding notice quoted above. 
In that section, the legislature states that a person has notice 
of a fact if he has reason to know of it. As already 
established, the statute does not require the giving of notice 
but the receipt of notification. The definitional sections 
relied upon by 4447 Associates simply do not apply in this case. 
4. Summary. 
In summary, the district court applied the proper rule 
of law. Section 70A-9-318 of the Utah Code is clear and 
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unequivocal. Unless First Security received notification that it 
was to pay money directly to Zions, it was free to settle its 
obligations with its original creditor, Capitol. This court 
should not reverse the legal determinations made by the lower 
court. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Found That First Security 
Did Not Receive Notification As Required By Section 
70A-9-318. 
Inasmuch as the district court applied the correct rule 
of law, its judgment may be reversed only if its factual findings 
are clearly erroneous. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989). The district court found that First 
Security did not receive notification of the assignment and of 
the duty to make payments to Zions. This finding should not be 
overturned by this court for two important reasons. First, 4447 
Associates has not marshaled the evidence as required when 
seeking to overturn the factual finding of a trial court. 
Second, even if 4447 Associates had marshaled the evidence, the 
district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 
1. 4447 Associates Has Not Marshaled the Evidence 
and Therefore the Factual Findings of the District 
Court Must Be Affirmed. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous only if it 
is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Reed v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company. 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989). The 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that 
As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on 
findings of fact, appellant must marshal all 
the evidence in support of the findings and 
demonstrate 'that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings.' 
Grayson Roper Limited v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989) . As the Utah Court of Appeals has noted: 
The marshaling requirement provides the 
appellate court the basis from which to 
conduct a meaningful and expedient review of 
facts challenged on appeal. 
Robb v. Anderton. 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
If an appellant does not meet his marshaling burden but rather 
selects only evidence favorable to his position without 
presenting the evidence supporting the trial court's finding, the 
appellate court will affirm the finding of the lower court. Id. 
In this case, 4447 Associates argues repeatedly that 
First Security received notice of its duty to pay Zions. This 
argument is contrary to the express findings of the trial court 
as supported by the evidence at trial, which is discussed in the 
next section of this brief. The court found that a notice was 
mailed to First Security by Mr. Floor on behalf of Capitol but 
that "Elmer Tucker [of First Security] never received the notice 
signed by Mr. Floor, and was never made aware of the Assignment 
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until 1986." Findings at 1 13. In addition, the court found 
that "[n]o individual representing or authorized to act on behalf 
of First Security received written notice of the Assignment prior 
to 1986." Id. at 1 14. Further, the court found that "no one 
acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice of the Assignment 
to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions communicate with 
First Security regarding the Assignment at any time between 
September 8, 1984, and July 10, 1985." Id. at 1 15. By arguing 
that First Security received notice, 4447 Associates is arguing 
that the district court's factual findings were clearly 
erroneous. However, 4447 Associates has cited to this appellate 
court only the portions of the evidence favorable to its 
position. Because 4447 Associates did not marshal the evidence, 
this court should affirm the factual findings of the district 
court. 
2. The Factual Findings of the District Court are not 
Clearly Erroneous. 
Even if 4447 Associates had marshaled the evidence as 
required, this court would have to affirm the lower court's 
decision because its findings of fact were not against the clear 
weight of the evidence. It is true, as 4447 Associates points 
out, that testimony was presented at trial that Mr. Potts, on 
behalf of Zions, had a notice mailed to First Security. However, 
the trial court rejected this testimony when it found that "[n]o 
one acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice of the 
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Assignment to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions 
communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at any 
time between September 8, 1984, and July 10, 1985. "n Id. at 
J 14. The trial court's decision is adequately supported by the 
record. For example, although Mr. Potts testified at trial that 
he instructed his secretary to mail the notice, he had stated 
previously under oath that he did not mail the notice. Also, 
when asked at his deposition whether he recalled "mailing the 
notice" and whether he "personally deposit[ed] it in the mail," 
he responded: "Obviously, I can't remember what happened six 
years ago." Transcript at 65. In addition, Mr. Tucker of First 
Security stated unequivocally at trial that he never received the 
notice and that any notice sent to the address listed on the 
notice would have reached him under the normal routing policies 
of First Security. 
The district court found Mr. Potts's trial testimony to 
be not credible for two reasons. First, there is no copy of the 
purported notice. Second, prior statements of Mr. Potts 
contradicted his trial testimony. The court held: 
nIn its brief, 4447 Associates sets forth a list of facts 
that it alleges are "undisputed in the record from the trial 
court." Brief of Appellant at 6. 4447 Associates claims that it 
is undisputed that "Potts [an employee of Zions] mailed a copy of 
the Notice to First Security." Brief of Appellant at 11. 
However, as pointed out above, not only was this fact disputed at 
trial, but the district court specifically found that Potts did 
not mail the notice to First Security. Findings at 5 14. 
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Mr. Potts also testified that he recalled 
sending a written notice of the Assignment to 
First Security. There is, however, no copy 
of such notice and prior statements by 
Mr. Potts on this issue seemed to suggest 
otherwise. The court finds that First 
Security did not receive written notice of 
the Assignment from Zions, and further finds 
that written notice was not sent to First 
Security from Zions' employees. 
In light of the clear testimony that First Security did not 
receive the notice and in light of Mr. Potts' prior statements 
suggesting that no notice was sent, it was not clearly erroneous 
for the district court to find that First Security did not 
receive notice. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court 
must be affirmed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE 
MUST BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD BY ONE MILLION DOLLARS 
The second main point raised on appeal by 4447 
Associates is that the district court erred in granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of First Security on the issue of 
whether the purchase price should be adjusted downward by 
$1,000,000. As an initial matter, First Security notes that the 
court does not need to reach this issue if it affirms the 
decision of the district court on the issue of whether First 
Security received notification. Because First Security did not 
receive notification as required by the statute, it was free to 
settle its obligation with the original obligor. It is 
undisputed that First Security did in fact settle the obligation 
with Capitol. This is a complete defense to any collection 
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attempts by Zions or by its successor in interest, 4447 
Associates. 
If the court reverses the decision of the lower court 
and holds that First Security must be required to pay the debt to 
4447 Associates even though it has satisfied the obligation 
already, then the amount due to 4447 Associates must be adjusted 
downward by one million dollars. 4447 Associates argues that the 
district court improperly interpreted the Closing Agreement and 
used the wrong date when it granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of First Security. However, 4447 Associates' argument is 
contrary to the unambiguous and express terms of the Closing 
Agreement. 
In arguing that the district court misread the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, 4447 Associates does not quote the entire 
portion of the relevant part of the Asset Purchase Agreement. In 
particular, 4447 Associates leaves out the important first 
sentence. The entire paragraph reads: 
At the end of the three (3) year period 
of deferral and prior to the payment of the 
principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price, the real estate and 
receivables of Capitol acquired by FS 
Financial shall be valued in the manner set 
forth below. In the event that (i) the 
aggregate value of the real estate is less 
than its book value as of the Closing Date 
and/or (ii) the actual and anticipated losses 
on the collection of the amount of the 
receivables as of the Closing Date exceeds 
the reserve for losses as of the Closing 
Date, the principal amount of the deferred 
portion of the purchase price shall be 
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adjusted downward in an equivalent amount. 
Further, the principal amount of the deferred 
portion of the purchase price shall also be 
adjusted downward in the amount of any 
liabilities of Capitol relating to the 
collection of receivables which were incurred 
in the normal course of business prior to 
Closing but were not disclosed on Capitol's 
balance sheet at Closing and which were 
assumed by FS Financial hereunder. The 
aggregate of such downward adjustments of the 
principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall in no event exceed 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). 
Notwithstanding any such downward adjustments 
of the principal amount of the deferred 
portion of the purchase price, there shall be 
no adjustment of the amount of interest paid 
by FS financial under Paragraph 2(C) hereof 
during the three (3) year period. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This language is clear. The parties agreed that three 
years after the Closing Date, the parties would determine the 
actual and anticipated losses on the collection (as of the third 
anniversary of the Closing Date) of the receivables that existed 
on the Closing Date. In other words, three years after closing, 
the parties were to evaluate the collections that had been made 
on the receivables that existed on the closing date. 4447 
Associates argues that the closing date for all purposes was in 
1985. This is true. But the closing date is not the only 
relevant date. 
The third year anniversary of the closing date is the 
key date for valuing the collections. If the only relevant date 
were the closing date, there would be no need to evaluate the 
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collections on the receivables. If the court were to read the 
paragraph as 4447 Associates urges, the only adjustment would be 
for the few hours between the time the Agreement was signed and 
the end of the day on the Closing Date and would reflect only 
collections made on the Closing Date. 
The district court properly held that the Agreement is 
unambiguous. Therefore, the only question before the court was 
the amount of the losses on collection. First Security came 
forward with admissible evidence that those losses exceeded 
$2,000,000. Zions did not dispute those facts or offer any 
evidence that the losses were less than $1,000,000 J2 Indeed, 
4447 Associates does not argue even on appeal that the losses as 
of December 13, 1985, did not exceed one million dollars but only 
that the court used the improper date. Because the court used 
the proper date and because Zions did not produce any evidence to 
contradict the evidence of loss submitted by First Security, the 
district court properly entered partial summary judgment in favor 
of First Security. 
124447 Associates argues for the first time on appeal that 
the methodology of First Security's expert was not sufficiently 
explained. 4447 Associates may not raise this new issue on 
appeal. Furthermore, Zions did not dispute the facts submitted 
by First Security as required by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Nor did Zions request additional time pursuant 
to Rule 56(f) to investigate the qualifications and methodology 
of First Security's expert. Accordingly, 4447 Associates may not 
raise these issues on appeal. 
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Finally, 4447 Associates argues that First Security did 
not present evidence as to the amount of the reserves on the 
Closing Date. This is an argument that was not raised before the 
district court. 4447 Associates may not raise this argument for 
the first time on appeal. Accordingly, this court should affirm 
the order of the trial court granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of First Security. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, First Security Financial 
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of the 
district court in this case. 
DATED this ' day of December, 1993. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
'A ^ — 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for First Security 
Financial, Defendant -
Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a National Banking 
Association, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-1578 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
ooOoo 
Defendant First Security Financial's motion for partial 
summary judgment came before this Court for regularly scheduled 
hearing on Friday, May 4, 1990, at 9:00 a.m. Defendant First 
Security Financial was represented by Mark O. Morris. Plaintiff 
Zions First National Bank was represented by Jeffrey M. Jones 
and Craig H. Christensen. After having reviewed the pleadings 
and other papers on file, and after having considered the arguments 
of counsel and the affidavit filed in connection therewith, 
this Court is of the opinion that the December 10, 1982 Asset 
00397 
Purchase Agreement and the December 13, 1982 Closing Agreement 
are unambiguous as to the relevant points raised by First Security 
Financial's motion, that there are no genuine issues of any 
material fact, and that defendant First Security Financial is 
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price 
of Capital Thrift and Loan Company, as that principal amount 
of the deferred portion of the purchase price is identified 
in paragraph 2 of the December 10, 1982 Asset Purchase Agreement 
(attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's Complaint) and in paragraph 
3 of the December 13, 1982 Closing Agreement (attached as Exhibit 
"B" to plaintiff's Complaint) shall be adjusted downward in 
the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). 
DATED this <L day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
<u 
FranR~G. Noel \~ 
District Court Judge \ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was 
served upon the following by hand delivering a copy of the same 
this ^"^ day of May, 1990: 
William G. Gibbs 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
Craig H. Christensen 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State 
Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 870901578 CV 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter was tried to the Court January 6, and 7, 
1992. The Court heard testimony, received evidence, heard oral 
argument and now having taken the matter under advisement and 
being fully advised finds and rules as follows: 
The Court will not endeavor a detailed description of the 
facts of this case. It will be sufficient to state the 
following: 
On the 10th day of December, 1982 Capitol Thrift and Loan 
Company (Capitol) entered into an asset purchase agreement with 
First Security Financial (First Security) wherein First Security 
agreed to purchase substantially all of the assets of Capitol. 
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At that time Richard A. Christenson (Christenson) was the 
president and majority stockholder of Capitol. At about that 
same time Christenson became president and a director of First 
Security. In June of 1984 the shareholders of Capitol sold 
their stock to AFS Holding Company and Christenson ceased to 
have ownership interest in Capitol and ceased to function as an 
officer of director. 
On or about September 28, 1984 the plaintiff Zions First 
National Bank (Zions) refinanced some of Capitol,s pre existing 
debt to Zions in the form of a One Million Dollar (1,000,000.00) 
loan. Christenson personally guaranteed the note arising from 
this loan in an amount up to $870,000.00. As collateral for the 
payment of this note Capitol pledged the receivable owing on the 
purchase agreement with First Security. 
Christenson's relationship with First Security terminated 
shortly thereafter in November of 1984. Christenson thereafter 
reaquired an interest in Capitol. At around the time of 
Christenson's departure from First Security, a dispute arose 
between Christenson and First Security arising out of their 
employer/employee relationship. In addition, First Security 
claimed a breach of warranties, representations and guarantees 
made by Christenson under the asset purchase agreement. In 
resolution of these issues Christenson, Capitol and First 
Security entered into a "Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
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Release and Covenant Not To Sue" on July 10, 1985. By virtue of 
that agreement First Security was relieved by Capitol and 
Christenson from any further obligations due and owing under the 
asset purchase agreement. Subsequent to this agreement Capitol 
and other obligors defaulted on the note in favor of Zions. 
Zions then sought to collect on the asset purchase agreement 
which as indicated had been pledged as collateral for the 
payment of the note. The primary issue in this case is whether 
First Security received notice of Capitol's pledge of the asset 
purchase agreement so as to require them to make payments under 
the agreement to Zions or to refrain from doing anything that 
would impair the security. First Security claims it did not 
receive such notice and was therefore free to extinguish, by 
contract, it's obligations to Capitol under the asset purchase 
agreement. 
The Court is of the opinion that under the circumstances 
of this case it was necessary for First Security to actually 
receive notice of the pledge of the collateral before it could 
be burdened with a legal obligation to make payments under the 
asset purchase agreement to the assignee, that is Zions. The 
notice must be sufficient so that someone in the position of 
First Security may rely with some degree of certainty on the 
notice to begin making payments under the contract to someone 
other than the obligee. First Security was obligated to make 
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payments to someone. To make those payments to someone other 
than the original obligee would put them at risk and may 
eventually result in their having to pay twice under the 
contract. Therefore some vague notice that the contract had 
been pledged as collateral was not, in the Court's opinion, 
sufficient notice. In addition a pledge of collateral may mean 
at least one of two things. It may mean that payments under the 
contract at the time of the assignment were to be made to the 
assignee, or it may mean that an effort to collect on the 
contract by the assignee would not be made until the assignor 
defaulted on it's obligation. First Security cannot be left to 
guess as to whom they must make their payments. Neither does 
the Court feel that First Security had an obligation of inquiry 
upon being put on notice of an "assignment". This concept has 
been embraced by our Supreme Court in Time Finance Corporation 
v, Johnson Trucking Company, 458 p2d 1873 (Utah 1969) wherein 
the Court quoted as follows: 
"The fact, however, of such substitution of a new 
creditor must, in order to make the debtor liable to the 
assignee, be brought home to the debtor with much 
exactness and certainty before he has paid the debt. The 
rule of notice to him is much more stringent than that 
which may defeat the title of a purchaser of a chose in 
action or of real estate. The later is free to purchase 
or refuse to purchase as he chooses, and therefore it is 
his duty, before acting to trace out any reasonable doubt 
and to inform himself of the true facts as soon as 
anything arises to put him on inquiry. But the debtor is 
not so situated. He must pay to his original creditor 
when the debt is due unless he can establish 
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affirmatively that someone else has a better right. The 
notice to him therefore must of so exact and specific a 
character as to convince him that he is no longer liable 
to such original creditor,....M 
Plaintiff claims that notice was given to First Security 
on the assignment in the following manner. 
1. Zions claims that Emanuel Floor, President of Capitol 
in September of 1984, sent written notice to First Security of 
the assignment. 
2. Zions claims that Allen L. Potts, an employee of 
Zions, called Christenson to inspect certain documents and 
discussed with him Zions intent to take the assignment. 
3. Allen L. Potts testified that he also sent a written 
notice to First Security, 
Zions argues that since Christenson was the president of 
First Security at the time of his conversations with Potts that 
these conversations put First Security on sufficient notice of 
the assignment. As to the written assignment prepared over the 
signature of Emanuel Floor, it should be noted that the notice 
was purportedly sent to the attention of First Security 
"Treasurer" at P. 0. Box 30006 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Elmer 
Tucker was the treasurer at all relevant times and any mail 
directed to that address would have been delivered to Mr. 
Tucker. The parties in this case have stipulated through the 
pre trial order and the Court so finds that Mr. Tucker never did 
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receive a written notice and was never made aware of the 
assignment and security agreement until 1986, well after the 
time that First Security had extinguished it#s liability to 
Capitol• 
As to Mr. Potts7 testimony regarding his conversations 
with Mr. Christenson it should be noted that these were 
primarily, according to Potts7 testimony, statements by Potts of 
an intent by Zions to enter into the assignment agreement. This 
alone would not be sufficient to put First Security on notice of 
the assignment and to trigger the obligation of First Security 
to begin making payments to Zions. it should be noted that Mr. 
Christenson testified that he did have conversations with Mr. 
Potts around that period of time but does not recall 
conversations regarding the assignment of the asset purchase 
agreement. In fact the evidence is unclear as to when 
Christenson did learn of the pledge of the receiveable. The 
parties have stipulated that it occured sometime prior to July 
10, 1985 but plaintiff has failed to prove that notice was given 
through Christenson to First Security prior to the time that 
Christenson terminated at First Security in November of 1984. 
Mr. Potts also testified that he recalls sending a 
written notice of the assignment to First Security. There is 
however no copy of such notice and prior statements by Mr. Potts 
on this issue seemed to suggest otherwise. The Court finds that 
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First Security did not receive written notice of the assignment 
from Zions, and further finds that written notice was not sent 
to First Security from Zions employees. 
The plaintiff also refers the Court to certain financial 
statements that, were given to First Security by Mr. Christenson 
and which contain language which suggests that the "receiveable" 
or asset purchase agreement had been pledged to Zions First 
National Bank. In the opinion of the Court this language 
clearly falls short of putting First Security on notice that 
they then had an obligation to begin making payments under the 
asset purchase agreement to Zions First National Bank. It is 
worth noting again that a pledge of a note as collateral does 
not necessarily mean that the obligor is obligated to 
immediately begin making payments under the obligation to the 
assignee of the obligation. Indeed the conduct of the parties 
clearly demonstrates to the Court that Zions did not intend to 
receive payments under the asset purchase agreement from First 
Security until Capitol defaulted on the note. Capitol did not 
default after December of 1985. And it was not until the first 
part of 1986 that Zions made any effort whatsoever to collect on 
the collateral. Of course by this time First Security and 
Capitol had entered into the release agreement extinguishing 
First Security's obligations under the asset purchase agreement. 
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In conclusion the Court finds that Christenson while he 
was president of First Security Financial did not receive notice 
that any amounts due or to become due under the asset purchase 
agreement had to be paid to Zions pursuant to an assignment 
agreement. The Court is of the opinion that plaintiff has 
failed to prove that notice of the assignment as required by law 
was given to First Security through Mr, Christenson or in any 
other way prior to the settlement agreement on July 10, 1985. 
The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove that First 
Security received sufficient notice of the assignment, as 
required by law, through any conversations that Mr, Christenson 
may have had in the latter part of September with Ronald K. 
Mitchell. 
The Court therefore finds in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff. 
First Security has raised the defense of laches and the 
Court feels compelled to make a comment with regard to that 
defense. Defendant argues that from the time of the assignment 
until the date of the settlement agreement between defendant and 
Capitol, that is July 10, 1985, Zions set on it's rights under 
the assignment, to the prejudice of First Security and that 
therefore they are barred from making this claim based on the 
doctrine of laches. The Court finds that argument to be 
unpersuasive. The Court has already stated that it appears to 
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have been the intent of the parties that Zions would not attempt 
a collection on the receiveable until and unless there was a 
default by Capitol on the note. The Court is of the opinion 
that Zions proceeded in a timely manner to collect on the 
receiveable after Capitol and the other obligors were in default 
on the note. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Judgment, and submit the same to 
opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then to the Court 
for signature. _** 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this day of January, 1992: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
Craig H. Christensen 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent H. Murdock 
Mark O. Morris 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P. O, Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Randall D, Benson 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
10 East South Temple, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
L_ /n^n^ \(Q{L*~-
TabC 
PI"T STRICT CWJOT 
7i> SJSICUM District 
Craig Carlile (A0571) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKEK 
92 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 226-7210 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, : 
a national banking association, 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
general partnership, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
: Civil No. 870901578CN 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a 
Utah corporation, : Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant, : 
ooOoo 
This matter came on before the Court for trial without a 
jury on January 6 and 7, 1992. The parties stipulated to reserve 
the issues of entitlement to and amount of attorneys' fees and costs 
until after entry of judgment. The plaintiffs were represented by 
Jeffrey M. Jones and che defendant was represented by Mark O. 
Morris. The Court having considered the evidence, pleadings and 
oral arguments submitted by the parties, and having entered a 
Memorandum Decision, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law: 
SEP 2 5 1992 
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FINDINGS QF FACT 
1. First Security Financial ("First Security") and Capitol 
Thrift & Loan Company ("Capitol") were parties to an Asset Purchase 
Agreement and Closing Agreement dated December 10, 1982 and 
December 13, 1982, respectively. These two documents are 
collectively referred to hereafter as the "Purchase Agreements." 
2. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreements, First Security 
purchased certain assets from Capitol. The Asset Purchase Agreement 
provided that First Security would pay Capitol $1,007,777.42 on 
December 13, 1985. The Purchase Agreements also provided for 
quarterly interest payments to be paid from First Security to 
Capitol in the amount of $25,194.44. 
3. The Purchase Agreements also provided that the sum of 
$1,007,777.42 due on December 13, 1985 was subject to an offset 
amount not to exceed $1,000,000.00. 
4. Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") was the 
president, chief operating officer, and a director of First Security 
from the time of its inception in December, 1982, through November, 
1984. He was also president and chief executive officer of Capitol 
until June, 1984. 
5. From December, 1982 to and including September 27, 
1984, First Security paid its quarterly interest installments to 
Capitol. 
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6. In June, 1984/ the shareholders of Capitol/ including 
Christenson, sold all of their Capitol stock to AFS Holding company, 
an affiliate of the Bertagnole Investment Company. In June, 1984, 
Christenson ceased, for a period of time, to have any ownership 
interests in Capitol, and ceased to function as an officer or 
director, 
7. In the summer of 1984, Capitol owed Zions First 
National Bank ("Zions") approximately $870,000 on a revolving line 
of credit. This line of credit was unsecured. 
8. On or about September 28, 1984, Emanuel A. Floor, 
acting as president of Capitol, and Zions executed an Assignment and 
Security Agreement, giving Zions a security interest in Capitol's 
receivable owing on the Purchase Agreements and directing Capitol to 
place First Security on notice of the Assignment and Security 
Agreement. This Assignment and Security Agreement (MAssignmentM) 
was given to secure a $1 million note, dated September 28, 1984, 
which Capitol executed in favor of Zions. The purpose of this note 
was to refinance the $870/000 obligation which was previously owed 
to Zions by Capitol. 
9. Christenson personally guaranteed the September 28/ 
1984 Note up to $870,000. 
10. For the purposes of giving notice to First Security 
concerning matters relating to the Asset Purchase Agreement, the 
only address provided to Capitol by First Security was: 
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First Security Financial 
P.O. Box 30006 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
ATTN: Treasurer 
Between December, 1982 and July, 1985, any mail sent to this address 
would have been delivered to Elmer Tucker, 
11. Elmer Tucker was the treasurer of First Security from 
its inception through and beyond July 10, 1985. 
12. Emanuel A. Floor in his capacity as president of 
Capitol executed a Notice of Assignment on or about September 28, 
1984. That Notice of Assignment was mailed to First Security but 
was never received by First Security. 
13. Elmer Tucker never received the notice signed by Mr. 
Floor, and was never made aware of the Assignment until 1986. 
14. No individual representing or authorized to act on 
behalf of First Security received written notice of the assignment 
prior to 1986. 
15. No one acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice 
of the assignment to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions 
communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at any time 
between September 8, J 984 and July 10, 1985. 
16. Zions never received written acknowledgement from 
First Security that First Security had received notice of the 
Assignment or notice of any purported obligation to pay any monies 
under the receivable to Zions. 
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17. On September 28, 1984 Christenson was President, Chief 
Executive Officer, and a director of First Security Financial. At 
that same time, he was not an officer, director or employee, nor had 
he any ownership interests in Capitol. 
18. To the extent that Allen Potts ("Potts"), an employee 
of Zions, discussed with Christenson the Assignment, the discussions 
were primarily of an intent by Zions to enter into the agreement, 
all of which discussions preceeded execution of the Assignment by 
Capitol and Zions. 
19. Capitol did not default on its obligations secured by 
the Assignment until at least December, 1985. 
20. The Assignment and Security Agreement, and the Notice 
of Assignment both stated that First Security was obligated to make 
all payments owing under the receivable payable jointly to Capitol 
and Zions during the entire term of the Purchase Agreement. Zions 
never received directly from First Security any of the quarterly 
interest payments it claims to have been entitled to under the 
Assignment. 
21. Zions received interest and principal payments on the 
Capitol loan directly from Bertagnole individuals or entities. 
22. Zions never attempted to collect any amounts from 
First Security under the Assignment until after December of 1985. 
23. Prior to July, 1985, Christenson delivered on two 
separate occasions his personal financial statements to the 
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president of First Security/ Bud Cummings. Paragraph 3 of each of 
those financial statements reads as follows: 
This represents my portion of the ownership of 
Capitol Thrift & Loan based on the contract 
amount I have with First Security Financial. 
This receivable has been pledged to Zions First 
National Bank. 
24. A third financial statement containing the identical 
paragraph 3 referenced above was delivered by Christenson's attorney 
to First Security's attorneys prior to July, 1985. 
25. On or about July 10, 1985, First Security, Christenson 
and Capitol entered into that certain Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release, and Covenant Not To Sue. 
26. In late 1986, 4447 Associates borrowed over three 
million dollars from Zions, and used those proceeds to purchase, 
among other things, a participation interest in the Capitol note, 
which included a security interest in the collateral for the note, 
First Security's receivable. In June, 1990 Zions assigned to 4447 
Associates all of its ownership interests in the Capitol loan and 
the First Security receivable. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann* §70A-9-318 applies to the Assignment and 
Security Agreement. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-318, First Security 
could not be held responsible to pay money to Zions under the 
Purchase Agreements absent receipt by First Security of actual 
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notice that the Assignment existed and that payments were to be made 
to Zions by reason of the Assignment; First Security never received 
such a notice. 
3. Knowledge of the existence of the Assignment alone, if 
any such knowledge existed, did not impose a duty to inquire on 
First Security. 
4. The pre-September 28, 1984, discussions between Allen 
Potts and Richard Christensen and the information concerning the 
Assignment contained in Mr, Christenson*s financial statements were 
both insufficient to place First Security on notice that Zions 
claimed and expected that payments under the Purchase Agreements 
were to be made to Zions. 
5. First Security never received adequate, legal notice of 
the Assignment sufficient to impose an obligation on First Security 
which would preclude First Security from satisfying its obligations 
under the Purchase Agreements directly with Capitol, the original 
account creditor. 
6. The July 10, 1985 Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Covenant Not to Sue signed by First Security, Christenson and 
Capitol relieved First Security of all obligations to pay any amount 
under the Purchase Agreements. 
7. Entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs are reserved 
and may be raised at any time by motion after entry of judgment. 
The issue of attorneys* fees and costs are collateral issues that do 
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not affect substantive issues in this matter, and thus, the judgment 
shall be a final judgment, there being no just reason to delay entry 
of a final judgment,
 <G 
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DATED this ,j2> day of September, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Frdhk IGV^NO*§X4/ 
D i s t r i c t Court dSi(lq$±SA:'' ; 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the r^ ' day of September, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Bruce J* Nelson 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
Craig H. Christensen 
Allen, Nelson, Hardy & Evans 
215 S State St #900 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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